Canadian Philosophy has a crucial albeit controversial history. Although its origins can
be found in the Scottish philosophical tradition, a distinctive Canadian Philosophy
emerged in its own right amidst French, British and U.S. influences. In The Faces of
Reason, Leslie Amour and Elizabeth Trott have argued in support of the existence of
Canadian Philosophy. Through an examination of its relationship to culture and its
emergence from the social and political context of a struggling nineteenth century
Canada, Armour and Trott examine some of the historical influences in Canadian
Philosophy. Beginning with James Beaven, an inquiry into Canadian Philosophy as an
academic discipline is eloquently and systematically established. The importance of
such an inquiry is made most convincingly: "If philosophy is connected with reason and
reason is connected with culture, then philosophy has unavoidable social implications."

The extent to which reason, culture and philosophy are integrated into a view which is
distinctively Canadian is the topic to be examined in the first part of this paper. In the
second section I will address claims by A.W. Cragg and John Irving, insofar as they
offer support for the claim that there is a distinctive Canadian philosophy. In the third
section I attempt to assess-or at least explain-why there remain many who are skeptical
about the existence of a specific "Canadian" philosophy, claiming that to argue for such
a thing is simply "narrow mindedness", as Mark Kennedy suggests. Likewise, critics
such as Thomas Goudge have argued that the proposal of a philosophy as distinctively
Canadian is a "complex disguise." Finally, I will address Armour and Trott's claims that
there are indeed distinctive elements in Canadian Philosophy. They have suggested that
questions of national identity undoubtedly have an impact of one's philosophy and one's
way of thinking.

I

A.B. McKillop, in A Disciplined Intelligence, notes, "Caught historically between a British
heritage...and an American neighbor...Anglo-Canadians in the Victorian era sought to establish and
to preserve in Canada a broad moral code that would constitute the core of a way of life reconciling
belief and inquiry, tradition and innovation, concern and freedom." This concern was more than an
attempt to maintain a national and cultural identity. Although this identity has been and continues to
be an issue for Canadians exacerbated by the recent Free Trade agreements, between the United
States and Canada, and more recently, the North American Free Trade Agreement, nineteenth
century Canada had its own unique social and political developments and, hence, its own unique
intellectual and philosophical responses to those developments.

As philosophers, Armour and Trott seem to be concerned with the limitations that have been placed
on philosophy. Noting that people have always struggled with definitions of philosophy, they explain
that "philosophy" must be construed widely to include the nature of reality, the art or science of
inference, and theories of knowledge and value. They also argue that philosophy is affected by the
fundamental ideas and circumstances in which they have been embodied, meaning that they are
always founded in a culture, and often are a response to social and political events taking place.
Choosing to limit their study to English Canada, they point to the work of James Beaven, who in
1850 wrote what seems to have been the first professional philosophy in Canada. Armour and Trott
believe that Beaven's interest, character, and perseverance were essential to the "coherent
development" of Canadian Philosophy up to a point shortly after World War II.

Culturally, Canada has dominated by Scottish, French, and Loyalist Settlements, all of which
Armour and Trott claim either have widely resisted or have not been affected significantly by
enlightenment individualism. However, there has also been a significant influence by others, such as
the British, Americans and Native peoples. These influences have had a unique impact on Canada,
as, quite simply, these various groups of people "had to learn to live together." They had to learn
about the values of the other and, in coming to understand what the other believed was true, came to
rethink their own values and truths. Ones sense of culture is the basis for ones ideas, beliefs and
values. Culture helps us to assign "meanings to human actions and to public events... Canadian
culture is young, open to the influences of the outside world, and subject to the changing composition
of its population."

In an attempt to discover the coherent foundation of this culture, Armour and Trott first examine the
major schools of thought that developed in Canada. One prominent school was the "Toronto School
of Intellectual History." Also surviving, particularly in French Canada, was a Roman Catholic
philosophy-Thomism. The existence of these two distinctive schools of thought give credence to the
claims concerning the influence that religious and social and political culture have on a culture, and
subsequently on new schools of thought and philosophies. It is reason, and what Armour and Trott
refer to as the "working concept of reason," that is crucial to culture. Through reason we assign new
meanings to things, and thus, reason provides a useful starting point for inquiry.

One problem that seems to emerge in this context, however, is that people tend to insist on a
"cultural homogeneity" perhaps due to the fact that people desire to know who they are and
"belong." Because of this, Armour and Trott claim that a "philosophical federalism"-a search to
understand ones neighbor as different from oneself-emerges. There is an attempt to explore
alternatives, merge seemingly contradictory ideas and to discover new ideas. These same forces led
to the development of "federal universities" in Canada. Although religion was prominent in the
curriculum in response to various events, philosophers such as James Beaven, George Paxton
Young, John Watson, and John Clark Murray produced work which demonstrated a "sense that the
development of society [especially Canadian society] is continuous and is not made by one man or a
dozen sitting down and drafting a plan on paper, even if they do so to the cheers of a thousand
others standing outside," noting that this has been one of the [important] distinctions between Canada
and the United States." "Young began the practice of carefully delineating issues of value conflict,
and the social theories of Watson and Murray, to a degree, admired both Marx and Henry George."

Another event that contributed to the development of a unique Canadian Philosophy was the
introduction of the railroad. It brought about a new infusion of settlers with diverse social and
religious practices and who were attempting to form a new community. "A strong communitarian
tendency implies that social change must take a community with it as a unity...The effect of a
multiplicity of essentially original communities which simply could not be dissolved made more
feasible the continuation of still more communities."

Armour and Trott contend that, unlike many Englishmen and Americans, Canadians thought that the
conflict between science and religion was one to be resolved. People responded to the conflict in
Europe and America by philosophical movements such as phenomenology and existentialism, the
latter of which Armour and Trott claim "diagnosed the sickness as something which stemmed from
the core of human nature." Canada primarily rests on the view that, "reason is primarily a function
through which one may seek to expand ones experiences, to reconcile conflicting values and claims."
The lack of such conciliation was felt in the United States as logical positivism, and other events such
as the depression, the reign of Hitler and Mussolini, left their mark of individualism on American
Philosophy.

Unlike philosophy in Britain and the United States, Canadian Philosophy was not completely
interrupted by these events. George Blewett and John Watson met different fates. While the revival
of religion laid the groundwork for the United Church of Canada, new philosophical responses led to
further responses by Rupert Lodge and George Brett, and perhaps Jacob Gould Schurman. These
philosophers had no immediate predecessors since "orthodoxy was enforced by Gilson and Maritain
from France. Though, John Irving tried to find a mixture of theory and practice" through the social
credit movement; and a social scientist, Harold Innis, turned to philosophy to find new and more
basic meaning in humans. Fear of social destruction brought complacency. American centers seemed
to focus on science and social science, and thus it appeared that science had won the
science-religion "war". While Blewett had emphasized the Canadian philosophy that nature is neither
sacred nor a toy, the American view that "nature is what you make of it" spread on both sides of the
border. Later, though, the need to view community as important to nature became apparent, and
departments of philosophy in Canada were infused with British and American trained, if not born,
philosophers. The scientific view continued to prevail through the practiced belief that truth is not
obtained through a process of reason but through empirical research. Only the Soviets seemed to
give credence to the claim that there was indeed a distinctively Canadian Philosophy to be explored,
contemplated, understood.

Perhaps the lack of education in Canadian Philosophy promotes a lack of understanding about
Canadian Philosophy. Although philosophy began to take on a "nationalist coloring" in the eighteenth
century, manifested in the empiricist-rationalist debate, Hume, "a consistent High Tory" defended his
skepticism. While these, as philosophies often are, were responses to various contentions about
what the world needs rather than reflections on the way it is (though it might not appear that way),
somehow the responses and reflections in Canada were either undermined or shadowed by the
powerful objectivist who "manned" the departments. The journals and societies were "manned" by
the same.

It seems, therefore, that rival theories and processes of knowledge and values lend themselves to a
diversity which people attempt to ignore or deny. Perhaps this is what happened to Canadian
Philosophy; but before this conclusion can be drawn, other views must be examined.

II

In 1950, a symposium on Canadian Philosophy was held in Canada and the Lectures were
published by the University of Toronto Press in 1952. Among the major essays presented were John
Irving's address on "One-Hundred years of Canadian Philosophy", and Charles Hendel's address on
"The character of Philosophy in Canada." Beginning with James Beaven, scholars such as Thomas
Reid, Dugald Stewart, John Watson, George Sidney Brett and Rupert Lodge were noted as having
contributed significant ideas to intellectual history and social philosophy.

Of particular interest was the philosophy of John Clark Murray, German educated, who is
considered to have represented "Common Sense" and "introduced into Canada the idea that the
work of the Scottish school must be supplemented by ancient, as well as by modern French and
German, philosophy. This broad approach entailed an emphasis on the history of philosophy and the
study of representative classical systems."

Later, referring to Watson, Irving discusses the leading representatives of Idealism and Realism in
Canada. One example is Brett who, as a realist claims, it is "difficult to place within the conventional
schools, either as ancient or modern," particularly noting his efforts not "to separate rigidly
philosophy and science." Giving reference to Lodge's specific type of transcendental idealism, and
other unique contributions to Canadian Philosophy, Irving then discusses Canadian scholars who
have contributed to intellectual history over the latter fifty years of his study. By noting that
"systematic moral philosophy" has long held a significant place in Canadian universities, particularly in
the Toronto curriculum, Irving attempts to demonstrate the uniqueness of Canadian Philosophy.
While he notes that the problems discussed by Canadian philosophers are not simply the concerns of
Canadians, he argues that "the humanistic temper of its philosophy, the happy relations that exist
between philosophers and social scientists in its universities, and the relative calmness of its national
life provide a unique opportunity for Canada to take the lead in the development of social
philosophy."

Choosing to speak of a "philosophy of Canada" as opposed to a "Canadian Philosophy", in an
attempt not to argue or mislead others into believing that there is a "national" philosophy that all
Canadians agree upon, Charles W. Hendel has discussed the unique developments in recent
philosophy in Canada. Noting that Canadians have contributed, and continue to do so, to the unique
dialogue concerning pragmatism, positivism and the study of science, Hendel has established how
these dialogues and inquiries have contributed to the social fabric of Canada.

Hendel's fear that philosophy in Canada will be interpreted as "nationalist" is interesting. Of course, it
would be absurd to argue this "nationalism", in a more traditional philosophical sense, anywhere,
since nations themselves are diverse, philosophically and otherwise. However, being sensitive to the
controversy generated by those who have developed and elaborated on Canadian intellectual history
one can come closer to an appreciation for non-nationalist, but cultural, philosophies.

Wesley Cragg espouses such an appreciation. He claims that philosophy indeed has been influenced
by cultural, social, and political events. An example of this is the radicalism that developed in the
1960's in the United States. This was in response to particular social and political events taking
place, such as the Vietnam "War". He notes that Canadian Philosophy seems to have been more
moderate concerning such issues, claiming that what emerges in the United States is often more
divisive.

Another interesting point made by A.W. Cragg is that Canadian philosophy departments were
originally small and isolated (except, perhaps, in Toronto), and the main source of faculty was Britain
and the United States. To avoid provincial and parochial tendencies, Cragg claims that serious
attention was taken away from Canadian institutions and practices. However, one ought not deny
that the social, political, and moral context of those departments, and of Canadian Philosophy, was
unique and significant.

Despite these many testimonies for a distinctive Canadian Philosophy, an intense debate about
philosophy in Canada and Canadian Philosophy emerged and still continues. Gauthier and Rabb
have written and developed course work in Canadian Philosophy, while McKillop continues to focus
on philosophy in terms of intellectual history, a perspective which Armour and Trott share. Yet the
controversy of "nationalism" continues. Let us then now turn to that controversy and examine the
reasons why many reject the notion of a distinctive Canadian Philosophy.

III

While Armour and Trott's book, The Faces of Reason, was received favorably, it was respected
primarily for its historical significance. What has continued to be called into question is the inclusion
of intellectual history as a unique process or development in philosophy. Many of the criticisms are
clear demonstrations of the bias of the critics toward the "scientific" and objective truths that Armour
and Trott claim "won the war".

David Braybrooke is, perhaps, one such example. Braybrooke, a Canadian who has worked in the
United States most of his life, argues that a distinctively Canadian Philosophy is not only absurd but
he also argues that there should not be one! While applauding the efforts in The Faces, Braybrooke
argues that the Oxford trained philosophers, such as William Dray, Charles Taylor and Francis
Sparshott are, perhaps, (depending on whom you ask) the most notorious of the recent generation of
philosophers in Canada. Braybrooke argues that there has not been much response to the
ethnopolitical intersection in Canada, implying that Armour and Trott are dead wrong in their claims
about Canadian Philosophy. He claims, as Armour and Trott have noted, that French Canadian
Philosophy has been influenced greatly by Thomism. He also says that the "agent's point of view", so
important to the intellectual history of Canadian Philosophy, and which has social causes, "may be
deeply sunk in ideological illusion." Clearly, this criticism reveals the preference for the philosophy of
"abroad". Referring to the work of several British and American philosophers, Braybrooke
re-establishes the traditionalist claim that there is a single, true definition of and process of
philosophy-which Canadians have yet to discover.

This same attitude is displayed by Mark Kennedy in his essay, "Narrow Minds". Kennedy argues
that Armour and Trott's work is an "attempt to discern or create specifically Canadian identities
through resurrection and contemplation of historical material." While he claims that their work will be
a welcome addition to Canadian history and philosophy, for its historical significance, he argues that
Armour and Trott's central tenet is that "reason and the Canadian environment have combined to
produce 'philosophical federalism'-a characteristic use of reason directed toward reconciling
conflicting values." "[This] 'philosophical federalism' depends on the successful delineation and
subsequent blending of a number of elements, two of which are an acceptable general notion of the
philosophical enterprise itself and a convincing analysis of the interrelation supposed to exist between
thinker and the Canadian cultural environment." Noting his displeasure with what Armour and Trott
have (and have not) covered, and how they have covered it, Kennedy claims they have an
"unexpected narrowness [that] combines with a familiar truth disclosed by the summaries [written by
Armour and Trott] themselves-namely, that the work of Canadian philosophers only makes sense in
the context of European ideas and tradition. The determination to show that genuine philosophy has
sprung from Canadian soil thus degenerates into an artificial unity imposed on monographs whose
internal evidence persistently contradicts this view. That the authors continue to affirm it indicates
their nationalist conviction that some such organizing principle is required to justify the investigation in
the first place." Claiming that these "so-called" Canadian philosophers are transplanted Europeans in
the first place, Kennedy rejects vehemently any such unique notions or processes as Canadian
Philosophy.

Francis Sparshott shares Kennedy's view about supposed Canadian Philosophy. He particularly
criticizes Armour and Trott's suggestion that if a central tenet of Armour and Trott's theory is
true-that it is the "agent" who is essential to Canadian Philosophy-then there will be too much
diversity in Canada to have shared convictions and philosophies, such as a Canadian one.
Comparing philosophy in Canada to philosophy in the United States, Sparshott admits that there are,
in many respects, many more interesting and creative dialogues taking place in Canada (for example,
the Canadian Philosophical Association grows each year and does so with a new creative energy,
while the American Philosophical Association seems to be stagnant) than in the United States.
However, he does not want to support, or admit that there exists, a Canadian Philosophy. He, too,
thinks it would be a "nationalist" move to do so.

J. T. Stevenson seems to be sympathetic to the plight of Armour and Trott, but finally agrees that the
book's greatest contribution lies in its historical contribution. One criticism that Stevenson makes is
that he believes, as others do, that Armour and Trott suggest that a rational order must be created,
hence interpreting the development of a Canadian Philosophy as a fabrication. Like Braybrooke, he
refers to the developments in French Canadian Philosophy and its reliance on Thomism, arguing that
Armour and Trott do not address it and that it is essentially a European doctrine. However, it should
be noted that Armour and Trott clearly state that they will not dedicate time to French Canada's
philosophical developments-not because they are not worthy, but because they represent a further
uniquely Canadian Philosophy, which will be and has been addressed by many in French Canada.

There are many others who share the views of Braybrooke, Sparshott, and Stevenson. T.A.
Goudge, for example, claims that Armour and Trott have simply reiterated what the early Canadian
philosophers reiterated-the ideas of Europeans. As a matter of fact, he refers to these ideas as
"complex disguises." Such criticisms reveal an attitude that is detrimental to philosophy and
intellectual history. Philosophy, presupposes a willingness to discover new ideas, a willingness to
engage in a critical examination of ones own ideas as well as those of others. To claim that there is
no distinctive Canadian Philosophy, seems, in the very least, to defy spirit of philosophy.

IV

Armour and Trott responded to many of their critics in an essay, "The Faces of Reason and Its
Critics." In response to Goudge, Stevenson, and Braybrooke in particular, they argue that it is
natural that the issues they address concern culture. They do not believe that their theory is idealistic
in the sense of being "dreamers". They argue that culture (and perhaps history) is more than just facts
to be examined empirically. Indeed, there are many unique ideas within a single culture, and thus
within diverse cultures. Although the rise of individualism is important to the scientific community,
community itself is an important factor in Canadian Philosophy, and this is in dramatic contrast to the
individualist basis that exists particularly in the United States. Indeed, much of the work done in
Canada was interdisciplinary, but this is to the credit of Canadian Philosophers. They reject the
suggestion that philosophy is or should be dogmatic (though much of it seems to be) noting that
Plato, THE philosopher, engaged in reason as the primary means by which truth could be obtained.
It is the very dogmatism that is implied in these criticisms that Armour and Trott want to reject.

It seems that the theories set forth by Armour and Trott are worthy of closer examination. The
dogmatism that has existed in traditional philosophy must be questioned and Armour and Trott have
attempted to do just that. They have set forth some interesting and controversial issues and claims.
Without undermining these, I would like to suggest that the controversy generated by their claims is
not unlike the controversy generated by feminists who have argued that traditionally, most, if not all,
disciplines have been dogmatic in claiming to be "value-free", in claiming that they alone espouse the
"truth". Admirably, Armour and Trott are not claiming that with Canadian Philosophy the "truth" is
espoused but they are claiming that Canadians have contributed (and continue to do so) to our
understanding of "truth".

The struggle for identity that Canadians have endured can be observed daily as they encounter
social, political and ethical issues concerning communication, multi-culturalism, the environment and
health care. As the security of the philosophy upon which nations base their struggle becomes
threatened, one can only imagine the extent to which this debate concerning identity will escalate.
However, the more respectful we become of other cultures the more likely we will be able to truly
discover "truth".

REFERENCES

Armour, Leslie and Elizabeth Trott. The Faces of Reason (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 1981).

Armour, Leslie. "The Canadian Tradition and the Common Good", in Etudes Maritainiennes V,
#5, Avril 1989.

----------. "Philosophy and Denominationalism in Ontario", in Journal of Canadian Studies, Vol.
20, No. 1 (Spring 1985).

----------. "Canada and the History of Philosophy", currently unpublished.

Braybrooke, David. "In Search of Canadian Philosophy", in Queen's Quarterly, 90/3 (Autumn
1983) 688-692.

----------. "The Philosophical Scene in Canada", in The Canadian Forum, January 1974.

Cragg, A. W. "Significant Trends in Canadian Social and Political Philosophy", in Eidos (5, 1: June
1986: 56-77).

Cragg, Wesley. "Two Concepts of Community or Moral Theory and Canadian Culture", in
Dialogue XXV (1986) 31-52.

Goudge, T. A. "A Century of Philosophy in English-Speaking Canada", in The Dalhousie Review,
47/4 (1967-1968) 537-549.

Goudge, Thomas. "Complex Disguises: Reason in Canadian Philosophy", in Dialogue XXII (1983)
339-346.

Hendel, Charles W. "The Character of Philosophy in Canada", in Philosophy in Canada (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1952).

Irving, John, et al, ed. Philosophy in Canada: A Symposium (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1952).

Kennedy, Mark. "Narrow Minds", in Books in Canada, April 1983.

Mathien, Thomas. Bibliography of Philosophy in Canada: A Research Guide (Kingston: R.P. Frye,
1989).

-----------. "The Natural History of Philosophy in Canada", in Dialogue XXV (1986) 53-65.

McKillop, Alexander Brian. A Disciplined Intelligence: Intellectual Inquiry and the Moral Imperative
in Anglo-Canadian Thought, 1850-1890 (Kingston: Microfilm Books, 1976).

----------. Contours of Canadian Thought (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987).

Rabb, Douglas. "Canadian Idealism, Philosophical Federalism, and World Peace", in Dialogue
XXV (1986) 93-103.

----------. Religion and Science in Early Canada (Kingston: Ronald P. Frye & Co., 1988).

Sparshott, Frances. "National Philosophy", in Dialogue XVI, No. 1 (1977).

Stevenson, J. T. "Reasonable Canadians", in Canadian Forum, June/July 1982.

----------. "Canadian Philosophy from a Cosmopolitan Point of View", in Dialogue (25: 1, 1986).

_______

Acknowledgments: Thanks to the Lock Haven University Faculty Professional Development
Committee, the Canadian Embassy, Leslie Armour, Elizabeth Trott, and Joseph McGinn for their
assistance in this project.